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Abstract
This paper analyzes the risk attitude and investment behavior of a group of heterogeneous
consumers who face an undesirable background risk. It is shown that standard risk aversion
at the individual level does not imply standard risk aversion at the group level under e¢ cient
risk sharing. This points to a potential divergence between individual and collective investment
choices in the presence of background risk. We show that if the membersabsolute risk tolerance
is increasing and satises a strong form of concavity, then the group has standard risk aversion.
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1 Introduction
Both conventional wisdom and empirical evidence suggest that people are more reluctant to invest
in risky assets when they face other sources of uninsurable and undesirable backgroundrisk (e.g.,
labor income risk).1 In a seminal paper, Kimball (1993) shows that an expected-utility maximizer
with decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA) and decreasing absolute prudence (DAP) will have
this type of response to background risk. The combination of DARA and DAP is referred to as
standard risk aversion. In the present study, we ask whether a group of diverse individuals, who
share risks e¢ ciently among themselves and make investment decisions jointly, will respond to
background risk in the same way. Specically, we want to identify the conditions under which the
groups preferences (or aggregate utility function) exhibit standard risk aversion.
It is well-known that if all members have DARA preferences, then the aggregate utility function
will have the same property. However, this is not true in general for DAP, as we will show below.
Thus, standard risk aversion at the individual level is not enough to ensure standard risk aversion
at the group level under an e¢ cient risk-sharing arrangement. This points to a potential divergence
between individual choices and e¢ cient collective choices. To x ideas, consider a household of two
adults, each with standard risk aversion. When acting alone, each of them would like to reduce
their exposure to risky assets in the presence of an undesirable background risk, but as a family
they may choose otherwise. To avoid this rather absurd prediction, it is necessary to impose some
stronger restrictions on individual memberspreferences. The main contribution of this paper is
to provide one such restriction. Specically, we show that if each individual members absolute
risk tolerance is increasing and satises a strong form of concavity (which is stronger than DAP)
then the aggregate utility function is standard. Since standard risk aversion implies proper risk
aversion and risk vulnerability, our result also ensures that the groups preferences will have these
properties.2
2 The Model
Consider a static model with a group made up of N individuals, N being an integer greater than
one. The group has a sure amount of initial wealth W > 0; which can be invested in two types
of assets: a safe asset with a riskless rate of return r > 0 and a risky asset with a random rate
of return eR: Let  and W    denote, respectively, the amount of risky and safe investment. The
1See, for instance, Guiso and Paiella (2008) and Calvet and Sodini (2014) for empirical evidence on this.
2The notions of proper risk aversionand risk vulnerabilityare introduced by Pratt and Zeckhauser (1987) and
Gollier and Pratt (1996), respectively. For a textbook treatment of these concepts, see Gollier (2001b, Chapter 9).
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gross return from this portfolio is given by
(W   ) (1 + r) + 

1 + eR = ! + ex;
where !  W (1 + r) > 0 and ex  eR   r is the excess return from the risky asset. The random
variable ex is drawn from a compact interval X  R according to some probability distribution.
Apart from the risky investment, the group also faces an exogenous, uninsurable background risk
ey in nal wealth. The background risk is drawn from a compact interval Y  R; it can take both
positive and negative values and is statistically independent of ex:3 The probability distributions of
ex and ey are known to all group members, so there is no disagreement in their probabilistic beliefs.
The sum of investment returns and background risk is used to nance the membersconsumption.
The group as a whole thus faces the following budget constraint:
NX
i=1
eci  ! + ex+ ey; (1)
where eci denotes member is consumption. Each members preferences can be represented by
E [ui (eci)] ; for i 2 f1; 2; :::; Ng : The utility function ui : R+ ! R is at least ve times di¤eren-
tiable, strictly increasing, strictly concave and satises the Inada condition lim
c!0
u0i (c) =1:
In the present study, we focus on e¢ cient decisions made by the group. Specically, this means
the members of the group collectively decide on a level of risky investment () and an allocation of
consumption (ec1;ec2; :::;ecN ) so as to maximize a weighted average of their expected utility, i.e.,
NX
i=1
iE [ui (eci)] ;
where i > 0 is the Pareto weight for member i; subject to (1) and eci  0 for all i: This problem
can be divided into two parts: First, conditional on the choice of  and the realization of (ex; ey) ;
the group solves a resources allocation problem:
bu (z)  max
fec1;:::;ecNg
NX
i=1
iui (eci) ; (2)
subject to
NX
i=1
eci  z  ! + ex+ ey; and eci  0 for all i:
3One way to interpret this background risk is as a random net income. A positive value of ey then represents a
windfall, while a negative value can be the result of a large, unanticipated expense.
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For any z > 0; the constraint set of the above problem is compact. This, together with a con-
tinuous and strictly concave objective function, ensures the existence of a unique solution. The
Inada condition ensures that the optimal choice of each eci is strictly positive. By the maximum
theorem, the aggregate utility function bu () is continuous and the optimal choice of each eci can
be determined by a single-valued continuous function i (z) ; known as the sharing rule. By the
implicit function theorem, if each ui () is (m+ 1) times di¤erentiable, then both i () and bu () are
m times di¤erentiable.4 Thus, under our stated assumptions, both i () and bu () are at least four
times di¤erentiable. In addition, bu () is strictly increasing and strictly concave.
The second part of the collective decision problem is a static portfolio choice problem:
max

E [bu (! + ex+ ey)] : (3)
Note that some restrictions on the choice of  are implicitly implied by the Inada condition. Since
the optimal choice of all eci must be strictly positive, the group must choose  so that z  !+ex+ey
is strictly positive for all possible realizations of (ex; ey) : Depending on the boundary values of X
and Y; this specication can allow for short-selling of the risky asset (i.e.,  < 0) or short-selling of
the safe asset (i.e.,  > W ). Since the objective function in (3) is continuous and strictly concave
in , a unique solution (denoted by ) exists.
3 Standard Risk Aversion of bu
For each member i 2 f1; 2; :::; Ng ; dene Ai (c)   u00i (c) =u0i (c) as the Arrow-Pratt measure
of absolute risk aversion and Pi (c)   u000i (c) =u00i (c) as the measure of absolute prudence. The
reciprocal of Ai (c) ; denoted by Ti (c) ; is the measure of absolute risk tolerance. The rst derivative
of Ti (c) is often referred to as absolute cautiousness [see, for instance, Wilson (1968) and Hara et al.
(2007)]. Since bu () is at least four times di¤erentiable, we can dene the corresponding measures,bA (z) ; bT (z) and bP (z) ; for the aggregate utility function. Wilson (1968) shows that there is a close
connection between Ti (c), bT (z) and the sharing rule i (z) : Specically,
0i (z) =
Ti [i (z)]bT (z) > 0 for all i; and (4)
4A formal proof of this statement is available from the author upon request. The same result is also mentioned in
Hara (2006).
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bT (z) = NX
i=1
Ti [i (z)] : (5)
Di¤erentiating both sides of (5) with respect to z gives
bT 0 (z) = NX
i=1
0i (z)T
0
i [i (z)] : (6)
Since
PN
i=1 [
0
i (z)] = 1; the absolute cautiousness of bu () can be viewed as a weighted average of
the individualsabsolute cautiousness (evaluated under the sharing rule).
We now consider the e¤ect of background risk on the groups investment decision. Note that the
portfolio choice problem in (3) is no di¤erent from the one faced by a single decision-maker (norma-
tive representative agent) with utility function bu () : Thus, according to the variant of Proposition 6
in Kimball (1993, p.610), any independent background risk ey that raises the representative agents
expected marginal utility under the optimal choice ; i.e.,
E
bu0 (! + ex+ ey)  E bu0 (! + ex) ;
will lower the absolute value of  if and only if bu () exhibits standard risk aversion, i.e., when bothbA () and bP () are decreasing functions.
The conditions for a decreasing bA () are well-known in existing literature. From (4) and (5),
it is obvious that if Ti () is an increasing function (or equivalently, Ai () is a decreasing function)
for all i; then bA () must be decreasing. The relation between Pi () and bP (), on the other hand, is
less explored. Our rst result is intended to ll this gap. Unless otherwise stated, all proofs can be
found in the Appendix.
Lemma 1 The representative agents absolute prudence is given by
bP (z)  NX
i=1

0i (z)
2
Pi [i (z)] ; (7)
with rst derivative
bP 0 (z) = NX
i=1

0i (z)
3
P 0i [i (z)] +
2h bT (z)i2
NX
i=1
0i (z)
n
T 0i [i (z)]  bT 0 (z)o2 : (8)
Proof of Lemma 1 Di¤erentiating Ti (c)   u0i (c) =u00i (c) with respect to c gives T 0i (c) =  1 +
Ti (c)Pi (c) for all c > 0: The counterpart for bu () is bT 0 (z) =  1 + bT (z) bP (z) for all z > 0:
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Substituting these questions into (6), and using
PN
i=1 [
0
i (z)] = 1 gives
bT (z) bP (z) = NX
i=1
0i (z)Ti [i (z)]Pi [i (z)] :
Equation (7) follows immediately by rearranging terms and applying (4). Next, di¤erentiating (7)
with respect to z gives
bP 0 (z) = NX
i=1

0i (z)
3
P 0i [i (z)] + 2
NX
i=1
0i (z)
00
i (z)Pi [i (z)] :
Di¤erentiating (4) with respect to z gives
00i (z) =
0i (z)bT (z)
n
T 0i [i (z)]  bT 0 (z)o :
Equation (8) can be obtained by combining the last two equations. This completes the proof. 
Equation (8) shows that the rst derivative of bP () can be decomposed into two parts: The rst
part captures the e¤ects of P 0i () on bP 0 () : In particular, this term is negative if all group members
have decreasing absolute prudence. The second term captures the e¤ects due to the heterogeneity in
absolute cautiousness across group members. Since bT 0 (z) is the weighted average of fT 0i [i (z)]gNi=1
under the set of weights f0i (z)gNi=1 ; the expression
PN
i=1 
0
i (z)
n
T 0i [i (z)]  bT 0 (z)o2 is the variance
of absolute cautiousness among the group members, which is always positive. This positive term
suggests that e¢ cient risk sharing has a tendency to raise the slope of bP () : Thus, even if all
members have DAP preferences, the representative agent may not have the same attribute. This
proves that standard risk aversion at the individual level does not imply standard risk aversion at
the group level under an e¢ cient risk-sharing arrangement.
This is not the rst study that points to a potential discordance between individual and collective
preferences under this type of arrangement. Hara et al. (2007) examine the second derivative ofbT (z) and the rst derivative of bT (z) =z in a similar model but without background risk.5 They
nd that e¢ cient risk sharing has a tendency to make bT (z) a convex function and increase the
slope of bT (z) =z: Thus, even if all group members have concave absolute risk tolerance or increasing
relative risk aversion (which is equivalent to a decreasing Ti (c) =c), the representative agent may not
have these characteristics. The concavity of bT () is of particular interest here due to the following
5The function bT (z) =z is the reciprocal of the relative risk aversion for the representative agent. Hara et al. (2007)
refer to this as relative risk tolerance.
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observation.6
Lemma 2 If bT () is increasing concave, then bP () is decreasing and bu () is standard.
Lemma 2 suggests one way to establish the standardness of bu () : The next question is under
what conditions will bT () be a concave function. Hara et al. (2007) have already shown that it
is not enough to have a concave Ti () for all i: This prompts us to consider a stronger form of
concavity, which is the notion of -concavityas discussed in Caplin and Nalebu¤ (1991).
For any  2 [ 1;1] ; a nonnegative function g () is called -concave if the transformed function
eg (x)  [g (x)] = is concave. Since g () and eg () are equivalent when  = 1; the usual notion of
concavity corresponds to the case of  = 1: Quasi-concavity and logconcavity of g () correspond,
respectively, to the cases of  =  1 and  = 0: In general, if g () is 1-concave, then it is also
2-concave for all 2  1: If both g () and eg () are twice di¤erentiable, then g () is -concave if
and only if
g (x) g00 (x)  (1  ) g0 (x)2 ; for all x:
The main result of this paper is to show that if each group members absolute risk tolerance is
-concave, for some   2; then the representative agents absolute risk tolerance is a concave
function. This result holds regardless of whether Ti () is monotonic. It follows that if each Ti () is
increasing and -concave, for some   2; then bT () is increasing concave and bu () is standard.7
Theorem 3 Suppose for each i 2 f1; 2; :::; Ng ; Ti () is -concave, for some   2; then bT () is a
concave function. If, in addition, each Ti () is increasing, then bu () is standard.
Proof of Theorem 3 As shown in Theorem 4 of Hara et al. (2007), the second derivative ofbT (z) can be expressed as
bT 00 (z) = NX
i=1

0i (z)
2
T 00i [i (z)] +
1bT (z)
NX
i=1
0i (z)T
0
i [i (z)]
n
T 0i [i (z)]  bT 0 (z)o :
Using (4) and (6), we can rewrite this as
bT 00 (z) = 1bT (z)
NX
i=1

0i (z)
 n
T 00i [i (z)]Ti [i (z)] +
 
T 0i [i (z)]
2o 
h bT 0 (z)i2bT (z) :
6This result has appeared in Gollier (2001b, p.166). Its proof follows immediately by noting that bP (z) > 0;bT (z) > 0 and bT 00 (z) = bT 0 (z) bP (z) + bT (z) bP 0 (z) for all z > 0:
7 If Ti () is increasing and -concave for some   2; then it is increasing and concave in the usual sense. Thus, by
Lemma 2, ui () has standard risk aversion.
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Thus, it su¢ ce to show that T 00i (c)Ti (c)+[T
0
i (c)]
2  0 for all c  0 and for all i: If Ti () is -concave
for some   2; then we have T 00i (c)Ti (c)  (1  ) [T 0i (c)]2 ; which implies
T 00i (c)Ti (c) +

T 0i (c)
2  (2  ) T 0i (c)2  0:
This completes the proof. 
In the economics literature, the assumption of -concavity is typically imposed on the density
function of some distributions.8 To the best of our knowledge, this is the rst study that applies
this type of concavity to characterize risk preferences. Suppose individualsabsolute risk tolerance
takes a power form as in Gollier (2001a, p.189), i.e., Ti (c) = ici ; for some constants i > 0 and
i  0: Then Ti (c) is -concave for some   2 if and only if i  0:5:
Theorem 3 has a number of implications regarding the representative agents risk preferences.
First, if bu () has standard risk aversion then it also exhibits proper risk aversion and risk vulnera-
bility as dened in Pratt and Zeckhauser (1987) and Gollier and Pratt (1996). Second, a decreasingbP () also implies that the fourth derivative of bu () is negative. Apps et al. (2014) show that this
property is not true in general even if u0000i () < 0 for all i:
8For instance, Caplin and Nalebu¤ (1991) impose this assumption on the distribution of voterscharacteristics in
a voting model; Ewerhart (2013) applies this on the distribution of bidderscharacteristics in auction models.
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